KARACHI, November 12, 2026: With newfound wealth and heightened political hubris under Prime Minister Modi, India is adding newer nuclear and conventional weapon systems. Also, it is acquiring nuclear-capable aircraft, missiles and sea-based systems. Its number of nuclear devices has risen to 190, surpassing Pakistan’s stockpile.
It is estimated that India operates several land-based nuclear-capable systems: two aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, six land-based ballistic missiles and one sea-based ballistic missile, with a few more being developed to be deployed soon.
India is producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-grade plutonium. India’s HEU production is largely assumed to be focused on producing fuel for its growing number of nuclear-powered vessels and submarines.
The original source of weapons-grade plutonium has been the reactor at Dhruva at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center complex near Mumbai. In 2026, India’s new 500-MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam reached criticality. If run at 80%, it can produce an estimated 140 kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year, good for 35 nuclear warheads. More fast breeder reactors are being planned. It is estimated that India has a stockpile of approximately 730 kg of weapons-grade plutonium.
India’s nuclear doctrine and strategy have historically been most focused on Pakistan and China, and recent clashes are reminders that tensions between India and Pakistan constitute one of the most concerning nuclear hot-spots on earth. The two nuclear-armed neighbours were engaged in open hostilities as recently as May 2025.
After an attack by a militant group that killed 26 people in Indian-occupied Kashmir, hostilities escalated. India carried out “Operation Sindoor”—missile strikes against what it termed “terrorist infrastructure” sites in Pakistan. Pakistan shot down five Indian fighter jets. The incident escalated into the nuclear realm when it triggered a convening of Pakistan’s National Command Authority.
In March 2022, India accidentally launched what appeared to be a BrahMos-launched cruise missile 124 kilometers inside Pakistan, damaging civilian property. Pakistan claimed that India did not alert them and did not even issue a public statement about the accident until two days later. If this same accidental launch had taken place during a period of heightened tensions, the response would have been catastrophic.
In November 2020, India and Pakistan exchanged artillery and gunfire over the Line of Control, resulting in 22 deaths. Also, in February 2019, Indian fighters dropped bombs at Balakot, Pakistan, in response to a suicide bombing. During this incident, Pakistani aircraft shot down and captured an Indian pilot before returning him a week later. The skirmish similarly prompted a convening of Pakistan’s National Command Authority.
| Strategic Focus Area | Key Events / Catalysts | Delivery Systems & Upgrades | Strategic Shift |
|---|---|---|---|
| Western Front (Pakistan) | • Feb 2019: Balakot airstrikes & aerial combat. • Nov 2020: LOC artillery exchanges. • Pakistani NCA convenings. |
• Prithvi-II SRBMs • Mirage 2000H/I & Jaguar IS (Upgraded) |
Tactical/operational deterrence against immediate regional threats. |
| Northern Front (China) | • 2017: Doklam standoff • May/June 2020: Pangong Tso & Galwan Valley • Dec 2022: Yangtse/Tawang conflict |
• Agni-IV & Agni-V (MIRV-capable) • Rafale EH/DH (150 total) • Rafale M (26 ordered) |
Pivot toward strategic full-spectrum deterrence across China. |
The expected expansion of India’s nuclear capabilities is increasingly focused on China and would lead to building newer and long-range capabilities. This will also influence India’s nuclear weapons against Pakistan. To credibly threaten China, India needs to pursue more aggressive strategies, i.e. escalation dominance or a better first strike.
India’s nuclear doctrine of no-first-use is somewhat altered by its 2003 declaration that it could potentially use nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attacks. Also, during the 2016 border skirmishes with Pakistan, the Indian Defence Minister indicated that India should not “bind” itself to the no-first-use. Thus, India’s NFU policy might put limits on the scope and strategy of Indian nuclear forces.
No credible public reports confirm that India has mated warheads with land-based missiles under normal circumstances. The first canistered missile (Agni-V) is now thought to be operational. India’s submarine fleet remains in early readiness but can be deployed with warheads to serve as a credible deterrence.
Until 2023, India’s only nuclear strike force was the Prithvi-II nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. It relied on aircraft as a flexible strike force in India’s nuclear posture. It had a few squadrons of Mirage 2000H and Jaguar IS aircraft for nuclear strike missions against Pakistan and China. These aircraft are regularly being upgraded for their role. Now, the French Rafale could replace the older aircraft.
The Rafale is used for the nuclear mission in the French Air Force, and India could potentially convert it to nuclear missions. In addition to 36 Rafale already purchased, in February 2026, India approved the purchase of an additional 114 Rafale fighters. Also, in April 2025, India placed an order for 26 Rafale Marine fighter jets for aircraft carriers INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya.
| Aircraft Model | Variant / Type | Role & Capabilities | Status / Procurement Details | Strategic Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEPECAT Jaguar | Jaguar IS / IB | Ground Strike & Attack; Historical Air-Based Nuclear Delivery | Legacy Fleet (Undergoing DARIN III upgrades; phased replacement planned) | India's original air-based nuclear strike platform; secondary reserve nuclear role. |
| Mirage 2000 | Mirage 2000H / I | Multi-role / Deep Strike; Certified Nuclear Delivery Platform | Core Strategic Fleet (Upgraded to 2000-I standard; expected service into 2030s–2040s) | Primary air-based nuclear deterrent against regional threats; tactical precision strike. |
| Dassault Rafale EH/DH | Multi-role (Land-based) | 4.5-Gen Omnirole; Nuclear Strike capable (French Air Force heritage) | 36 Operational (Acquired in 2016) • 114 Additional (DAC approval Feb 2026) |
Modernization centerpiece to replace legacy strike platforms for high-value strategic missions. |
| Dassault Rafale M | Marine (Carrier-based) | Multi-role Carrier Borne Fighter (MRCBF) | 26 Aircraft (Ordered April 2025) | Carrier-based air defense & strike for INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya. |
India has been developing the ability to deliver multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on ballistic missiles and, in March 2024, India announced that it had conducted the first flight test of its Agni-V ballistic missile with MIRV technology. Another MIRV test was conducted in May 2026.
Deploying missiles with multiple warheads also invites questions about the credibility of India’s minimum deterrent doctrine, as MIRV technology was developed to increase the number of targets that can be attacked to overwhelm missile defences. Deploying MIRVs would reflect a strategy to swiftly strike multiple targets simultaneously and, as a result, signal an intention to quickly increase the size of the nuclear arsenal. It will lead to an arms race in Asia.
India is rumoured to have begun development of a new ICBM, the Agni-VI, with a strike-range of 8,000–10,000 kilometers. Agni will be capable of being launched from submarines as well as from land. This would extend the potential regional targets in Pakistan and China. In addition, India is also developing a short-range K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), known as the Shaurya.
With an extensive rail network, India is also prioritizing the development of a rail-based missile launch capability. It will allow India to transport personnel, materiel and launch systems relatively quickly. In September 2025, India conducted its first rail-based test launch of its new Agni-P ballistic missile.
India has at least two rail-based missile garrisons. Both garrisons include several common facilities, such as drive-through high-bay buildings, likely missile checkout facilities, storage facilities and rail-based entrances/exits connecting them to the country’s broader rail network. India has deployed a rail-based missile system since 2008, with a range of more than 2,000 kilometers. It has also developed a rail-mobile weapon system that can deliver a nuclear warhead over 3,200 kilometers.
India’s first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the INS Arihant, was commissioned in August 2016. A second SSBN, the INS Arighaat, was launched on November 19, 2017, but did not begin sea trials until the beginning of 2022. The Arighaat is followed by two more SSBNs of the same class, the INS Aridhaman and INS Arisudan.
| Strategic Platform | System / Class | Operational Capabilities | Status & Timeline | Infrastructure & Strategic Role |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rail-Mobile Ballistic Missiles | Agni-II (2,000+ km) Agni-III (3,200+ km) |
Land-based mobile nuclear warhead delivery; off-road dispersal via rail networks | Deployed operationally since 2008 (Agni-II) and advanced variants | Supported by at least 2 specialized rail garrisons with high-bay checkout buildings, storage, and national rail access. |
| Nuclear Submarine (SSBN) | INS Arihant (S2) | Indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (Arihant-class) | Commissioned in August 2016 | Completed India's nuclear triad; provides continuous sea-based second-strike deterrence. |
| Nuclear Submarine (SSBN) | INS Arighaat (S3) | Indigenous Arihant-class SSBN (upgraded payload capability) | Launched Nov 2017; Sea trials started early 2022; Commissioned into service | Strengthens continuous ocean-going nuclear deterrence patrols. |
| Future SSBN Fleet | INS Aridhaman (S4) INS Arisudan (S4*) |
Expanded Arihant-class follow-on SSBNs with longer missile tubes | Under construction / advanced fitting out stage | Scales up India's sea-based strategic deterrence capacity in the Indo-Pacific. |
Like many other nuclear-armed countries, India is developing multiple types of cruise missiles. India’s first locally produced cruise missile (the Nirbhay) resembles the US Tomahawk. It is a subsonic cruise missile having a 1,000-kilometer range with a payload of 300-kilogram warheads. India is developing several versions of Nirbhay with greater ranges.
Pakistan’s Options and Responses
Pakistan does not need to match India’s entire nuclear/military ecosystem to maintain credible nuclear deterrence. All it needs is a force that survives and a military able to resist conventional aggression. It must maintain command-control and a sound economy.
The main thrust is to have the capability to deter an attack and build the ability to eliminate incoming vulnerability. The best outcome for Pakistan is to have the strength to avoid nuclear attack or major other escalation, keeping control and communication during a crisis. In short, a good policy would be to have capabilities that contribute to deterrence, survivability and reliability. Any undue expansion diverts essential economic development resources to militarisation.
But there is a fundamental problem: weapons designed to prevent a limited war will escalate it into a nuclear disaster. We need to consider the following: (a) nuclear uncertainty of response may discourage the enemy; (b) an adversary will doubt Pakistan’s determination to use nuclear weapons in case of serious loss; and (c) nuclear use could trigger an uncontrollable chain of retaliation.
Ideally, Pakistan should preserve the ultimate deterrent and remain cautious about a strategy of early nuclear use as its strategy. It should build on crisis management to reduce the pressure to cross into the nuclear theatre. Its strategy should be based on a nuclear triad—land-, air- and sea-based delivery.
Pakistan should emphasise strict procedures, secure communications, personnel, the best nuclear security and avoid unauthorized use with the best crisis protocols. It should balance strategic expenditure against development, financial stability, energy security, education, industrial growth and conventional military readiness.
Any new defence investment must add to positive deterrence and resilience. Pakistan already follows an approach of credible minimum deterrence under a policy of full-spectrum deterrence. It must keep that deterrent against India’s evolving capabilities, avoiding expansion in every category of weapon. Visible deterrence is not the sum of the numbers of nuclear devices, missiles and submarines.

